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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
c·ARL STURDAVANT, 
Pla.int.iff and Appellant) 
-vs.-
KENNETH COVINGTON, 
Defenda;nt and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEl\tfENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8132 
A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Plaintiff and appellant will be referred to throughout 
this brief as plaintiff; defendant and respondent as 
defendant. 
All italics are ours. 
B. THE FACTS 
This action resulted from a collision when a 1948 
Chevrolet sedan, owned and operated by defendant, ran 
against the rear end of a 194 7 Cadillac sedan, owned 
and operated by plaintiff. The collision occurred at 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
ap·proximately 3 :10 o'clock p.m., on the 17th day of 
November, 1951, in the Town of American Fork, Utah, 
on Main Street ap·proximately 60 feet east of the inter-
section of Main Street with Center Street. Main Street 
is the main highway, U.S. 91, which runs through Ameri-
can F·ork in an east-west direction. Said street consists of 
four driving lanes and two parallel parking lanes. Center 
Street runs in a n~rth-south direction, intersecting Main 
Street in the approximate center of town (Exs. "A", "B", 
"C", "D" and "E"). Traffic at said intersection is regu-
lated by a semaphore signal. A Texaco Service Station 
is located on the southeast corner, and a two-story bank 
building on the northeast corner of said intersection. On 
the corner of the bank building there is a clock with faces 
showing 'vest and south (Exs. "A", "B", "C", "D" and 
"E"). 
Plaintiff was traveling in an easterly direction along 
the outside driving lane of Main Street. Defendant was 
traveling a short distance behind in the same direction 
and in the same lane of traffic. 
Plaintiff was on his way to Los Angeles, California 
(R. 73). Defendant was on his way to work at Geneva, 
Utah (R·. 161). It is undisputed that plaintiff stopped for 
the red light at the intersection of 1fain and Center 
Streets (R. 162). Defendant testified that he was follow-
ing about 100 fee't behind plaintiff, that he slowed down 
for the light, closing the gap between them, but that the 
light turned before it was necessary for him to stop (R. 
170, 171), that he was about 15 or 16 feet behind as plain-
tiff p·roceeded through the intersection and that both he 
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and plaintiff were traveling at approximately 10 miles 
per hour (R. 163); that plaintiff came to a sudden stop 
at the point of the collision and that he (defendant) could 
not stop in time to avoid crashing into the rear of plain-
tiff's automobile, at a speed of about 5 miles per hour 
(R. 167, 174). No other vehicles were in the immediate 
vicinity (R·. 163). Plaintiff testified that as the light 
turned green a small dog trotted into the intersection 
and along in an easterly direction in front of his car 
(R .. 76); that he pToceeded at ap.proximately 6 miles per 
hour, or less, and honked at the dog (R. 77) ; that at a 
point abou't 60 feet east of the intersection the dog sud-
denly stopped (R. 77, 107) ; that he immediately applied 
his brakes and came to a stop and that almost immedi-
ately thereafter defendant crashed into the rear of his 
automobile (R. 78). The next thing he knew he wa.s 
stopped about 50 feet beyond the point of impact and in 
the same lane of traffic, though sligh.tly to the right of 
where he had been traveling (R. 78). 
Defendant testified that he did not see a dog. He 
admitted, however, that plaintiff told him about the dog 
almost immediately after the collision (R. 163, 165). ·The 
p:laintiff testified that just after the collision defendant 
told him (R. 78) : " 'Where did you come from~ I failed 
to see you up until this time, this is the first I seen you.' 
And that was after the accident. And he says he was 
sorry but he was looking at the clock across the corner 
and he wondered what happened, how come it was so 
late." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
Defendant testified that he looked at the clock about 
the time he crossed the west pedestrian lane, ascertained 
that it showed 3:10 o'clock p.m., and gave said ti1ne to the 
investigating officer as the time of the collision (R. 163, 
172). The officer remembered that son1ething 'vas said 
about the· clock ( R. 157). 
Defendant testified that his auton1obile left skid 
marks from his application of brakes. He later admitted, 
however, that his automobile left no skid marks (R. 175). 
The police officer testified that he issued a citation 
to defendant for the reason stated on the back of the acci-
dent report, "Failure to keep proper lookout" (R. 159, 
Ex. "G") ; that he obtained the information on the acci-
dent report by questioning the drivers (R. 156). It ap-
pears on the accident report that defendant was traveling 
a:t a speed of 20 miles per hour when the danger 'vas first 
noticed, and 15 miles per hour at impact. Furthermore, 
the accident rep·ort leaves a blank next to the question 
of the distance when the defendant first noticed the 
danger (Ex. "G"). 
The repair bills for both- automobiles were introduced 
in evidence as plaintiff's Exhibit "F·". They show a 
rep·a.ir bill on plaintiff's auto1nobile in the smn of $992.42, 
and defendant's automobile in the sum of $227.65. 
Plaintiff testified that his windows were closed and 
that he had no opportunity to give an arm signal (R. 
110, 112); also that his lights were checked at CalO'arY 
0 . ' Canada on the same trip (R. 73). 
Defendant testified on cross-examination concerning 
plaintiff's brake lights as follows (R .. 192) : 
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"Q. Mr. Covington, did you at any time see the 
brake lights of Mr. Sturdavant's car before 
the impact~ 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. There were brake lights~ 
A. I don't remember if he had them. 
Q. You testified in your deposition you didn't 
see those lights; is that your testimony now~ 
A. Yes." 
On redirect examination he testified as follows (R. 
193): 
"Q. * * * * You testified you pulled up behind Mr. 
Sturdavant's car before the intersection~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And from then on you watched his car~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And until he stopped could you see his tail 
lights~ 
A. Not until he stopped, no. 
Q. I't wasn't lighted up until he stop,ped, is that 
so~ 
A. That's right." 
Then, on recross examination (R. 193): 
"Q. I am a little confused, Mr. c·ovington. Isn't 
this your testimony in the deposition that 
was taken, page 11, 'Did you see the brake 
lights of Mr. Sturdavan't's car~ A. No.' 
Did you make that answer to that question~ 
• * • • • 
A. Yes." 
In the pleadings plaintiff p·rayed for damages for 
pers-onal injuries -and costs of repairs for his automobile. 
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Defendant counterclaimed, praying for da1nages for per-
sonal injuries and costs of repair for his auton1obile. 
At the conclusion of the evidence plaintiff requested 
instructions that as a matter of law defendant \Yas guilty 
of negligence which pToximately caused plaintiff's in-
juries and damage and that as a matter of la\v plaintiff 
was free from contributory negligence. (See plaintiff's 
Requested Instructions Nos. 1 and 3, R. 23, 25). These 
requested instructions were refused by the trial court 
and duly excepted to by plaintiff. Plaintiff likewise made 
a motion for a directed verdict in his favor on defendant's 
counterclaim. The trial court submitted the issues of 
defendant's and plaintiff's negligence to the jury, both 
as to plaintiff's complaint and as to defendant's counter-
claim. His instructions on these issues were likewise duly 
excepted to by plaintiff's counsel. (See the Court's In-
structions Nos. 7, 11, R. 53, 55, and plaintiff's exceptions 
to said instructions R. 200). 
The jury rendere·d verdicts of no cause of action on 
both plaintiff's complaint and defendant's counterclain1 
(R. 61, 62). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS. 
P·OINT I. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY 
OF NEGLIGENCE, WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED THE 
COLLISION. 
POINT II. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW PLAINTIFF WAS NOT GUILTY 
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
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ARGUMENT 
P·OINT I. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY 
OF NEGLIGENCE, WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED THE 
COLLISION. 
The trial court instructed the jury in part as follows 
(R. 53) : 
Instruction No. 7 
" * * * In this case the plaintiff has the· burden 
of proving by a p.reponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant was negligent in one or more 
of the particulars set forth in Instruction No. 1, 
and that such negligence proximately caused the 
plaintiff's injuries and damages. And unless you 
find that the plaintiff has sustained this burden 
of p·roof you must find your verdict in favor of 
the defendant, 'no cause of action'." 
Plaintiff excepted to Instruction No. 7 upon the 
grounds and for the reason that as a matter of law 
defendant was guilty of negligence (R. 200). 
Utah Code An.nota,ted, 1953, Section 41-6-62 (a), pro-
vides: 
"The driver of a motor vehicle shall not fol-
low another vehicle more closely than is reason-
able and prudent, having due regard for the speed 
of such vehicles ·and the traffic upon and the con-
dition of the highway." 
It is plaintiff's position, supported by the weigh't of 
authority, that the statutory and common law require-
ment of reasonableness and prudence imposes upon a 
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following driver th·e duty of 1naintaining such control 
over his automobile that he can stop short of collision in 
the event a leading automobile should suddenly stop, 
either with or without warning, and if a driver does not 
so operate and control his automobile and a collision 
ensues he is negligent a.s a matter of law. 
A recent case in point is Miller v.· Cody et 1lX., (Wash. 
1953), 252 P. 2d 303. In that case plaintiff was driving 
the leading automobile and defendant was following. 
Both automobiles were stopped at a "T" intersection, 
intending to make left turns. Plaintiff proceeded forward 
slowly to determine if the way was clear. After she had 
traveled about 8 to 10 feet she suddenly stopped and a 
rear-end collision ensued. She had no opportunity to 
give pTior warning of her intention to stop. After plain-
tiff had received an adverse jury verdict, the trial court 
granted a new trial, holding as a matter of law, that 
defendant was negligent and that plaintiff was free from 
contributory negligence. This holding was sustained on 
appeal. 
In McDwniel v. Capitol Transport Co. Inc., et al., 
(La. 1948), 35 S·o. 2d 38, plaintiff was driving an auto-
mobile on a rainy night when he saw several cows cross-
ing the highway. He slowed down to approximately 5 
miles p·er hour and a truck, driven by defendant's em-
ployee, crashed into the rear of plaintiff's automobile. 
The court held that regardless of the distance between 
the two vehicles defendant was negligent, it being obvious 
that defendant's employee did not 1naintain sufficient 
distance between the vehicles and drive at such speed 
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that he could avoid striking plaintiff's car in case of an 
e1nergency. Here again plaintiff had no op·portunity to 
give warning before suddenly slowing down. 
In Roberson v. Rodriguez et a.l., (La. 1939), 186 So. 
853, the court discussed a statute identical to our Utah 
statute. In that case defendant was driving his auto-
Inobile approxiina.tely 40 mph along a two-lane highway, 
with a rail on the right side. He came over a slight rise 
and approached a horse-drawn wagon proceeding in the 
same direction. At the sa1ne time defendant saw an a.uto-
Hlobile approaching from the opposite direction and 
applied his brakes without an opportunity to give prior 
vvarning. Plaintiff's automobile came into a rear-end 
collision with defendant's automobile. From his position 
plaintiff \vas unable to see the wagon. The court held as 
a matter of la.vv that the proximate cause of the collision 
\Vas plaintiff's violation of statutory duty, i.e., his negli-
gence in following defendant's auton1obile too closely and 
at such speed that he did not have his automobile under 
safe and proper control. 
In Sniffen v. Huschle, (N.Y. 1923), 200 N.Y. Supp. 
206, defendant's truck was proceeding along Dean Street, 
Brooklyn. The truck suddenly stopped without a signal 
and plaintiff's automobile ran into the rear of the truck. 
The truck driver testified that another truck was ap-
proaching, that a boy ran in front of the approaching 
truck from the sidewalk and then ran back again immedi-
ately in front of defendant's truck, and that he jammed 
on the brakes. 
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On appeal it was held as a matter of law that plain-
tiff was guilty of negligence in following a truck that 
was traveling in second speed, at 8 or 10 miles per hour, 
while p~laintiff was behind the truck some 10 or 15 feet 
and going at a speed of o;ver 16 miles p·er hour. The 
court also held as a matter of law that defendant was not 
guilty of negligence. 
In Phillips v. Haring, (Wis. 1952), 5-! N.W. 2d 200, 
262 Wis. 174, plaintiff's automobile was overtaking de-
fendant's tractor-trailer unit. Defendant's vehicle slo,ved 
down to 1nake a left turn at an intersection, and a rear-
end collision ensued. The appellate court held as a mat-
ter of law that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence in driving so close to defendant's vehicle and at 
such speed as not to be able to avoid the collision. 
See also Cyclopedia of Autom,obile Law and Pr'actice 
by Blashfield, Vol. 2, Sec. 942, at page 143, "'here it is 
stated: 
"A motorist has right to follow another 
motorist at reasonable and safe distance. How-
ever, he must govern his speed or keep. back a 
reasonably safe distance so as to provide for the 
contingency of a car in front suddenly stopping, 
maintaining a pToper lookout for the car immedi-
ately pTeceding him, and so that he can stop with-
out a collision, or can turn out sufficiently to p·ass 
the vehicle in front with.out going across the street 
in the way of traffic ap·proaching from the op-
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posite direction, as that will naturally result in 
collision with such traffic." 
To the same general effect see: 
MacNeiJll v. Makos, (Pa. 1951), 77 A. 2d 378, 
366 Pa. 465; 
Gandy v. Arrant, (La. 1951), 50 So. 2d 676; 
Tackett et ux. v. Milburn et al., (Wash. 1950), 
218 P. 2d 298; 
Sutherland v. Cotter, (Tex. 1949), 226 S. W. 
2d 476; 
Matthews v. Mound City Cab Co., et al., (Mo. 
1947), 205 S. W. 2d 243; 
Vienne et al. v. Chalona et al., (La. 1946), 
28 s.o. 2d 154 ; 
Fu.Zd v. Marylwnd Casualty Co., (La. 1938), 
178 So. 201; 
Bu,da v. Foley, (Mass. 1939), 19 N. E. 2d 537; 
Richmond Coca Cola Bottling Works Inc. t\ 
Andrews et al., (Va. 1939), 3 S.E. 2d 419; 
LeZar v. Qu-aker City Cabs, Inc. et al., (Pa. 
1933), 164 A. 105; 
Rankin et al. v. Na.sh-Texa.s Co. et al., (Tex. 
1934), 73 s. w. 2d 680; 
Williamson v. Clark, (Vt. 1931), 153 A. 448; 
Ritter et ux. v. Johnson, (Wash. 1931), 300 
Pac. 518; 
Session v. Kinchen, (La. 1938), 178 So. 635; 
Riccio v. Ginsberg, (R. I. 1927), 139 A. 652; 
Rust v. Schlai1tzer, (Wash. 1933), 27 P. 2d 
571; 
Gornstein v. Priver, (Cal. 1923), 221 Pac. 
396, 64 Cal. App. 249; 
Ghent v. Stevens, (Conn. 1932), 159 A. 94. 
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An analogy tnay be drawn bet\veen the case at bar 
and Dalley v . .L~fid-Western Dairy Products Co., et al., 
(Utah, 1932), 15 P. 2d 309, 80 Utah 331. There defend-
ant left an unlighted truck on a high\vay at night. The 
plaintiff, who collided with defendant's truck, testified 
that he was keeping a constant lookout ahead but did 
not see the truck until \vithin 15 to 20 feet. The court 
held that plaintiff was negligent as a 1natter of la,v, 
stating: 
"In this jurisdiction the doctrine is estab-
lished 'that it is negligence as n1atter of la\v for a 
person to drive an automobile upon a traveled 
public highway, used by vehicles and pedestrians, 
at such a. rate of sp·eed that said auto1nobile can-
not be stop·ped within the distance at which the 
operator of said car is able to see objects upon 
the highway in front of him.' " 
Here, just as in the Dalley case, the driver \vas un-
able to prevent collision \vith. a vehicle ahead on the high-
way. 
In the Dalley case the likelihood of an unlighted 
obstruction ahead gave rise to an absolute duty on the 
part of a driver to avoid a collision. In the case at bar 
we submit that the greater likelihood of a sudden stop 
by a leading vehicle in the center of a busy n1etropolis 
should give rise to a similar absolute duty on the part 
of a driver to avoid a collision. 
The situation of a person driving too fast for his 
area of visibility is certainly analogous to the situation 
of a person driving too fast at the distance he is follow·-
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ing a vehicle to be able to avoid collision in case of a 
sudden stop by the leading vehicle. We strongly contend 
that the considerations involved in adopting rules for 
safe driving are the same in both cases. 
In 20 .A.1n. J ur. p. 1032, it is said: 
"Clearly, if a party, as a \vitness, unequivo-
cally concedes a fact, such concession, for the pur-
poses of trial, has the force of a judicial admission, 
and a party is bound there by * * * . " 
Defendant testified on cross-exarnination as follows 
(R. 171): 
""Q. ..._~nd I presu1ne that as he stopped at the 
stop light, then you started to din1inish the 
distance between you and him? 
.. :\. Yes. 
Q. You didn't stop at the stop light~ 
..._\.. No. 
Q. But it is your testi1nony, as I understand it, 
that you think that he was going about ten 
n1iles per hour after he had started up from 
that stop sign and down by the point where 
he put on his brakes? · 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you also testified you were going about 
the same speed he was from the stop light 
on1 
A. Yes. 
Q. So that you would have been going about ten 
1niles an hour also, and at any rate you didn't 
start overtaking him before he put on his 
brakes to stop? 
A. No. 
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Q. You think you were going about the same 
speed he was up to the time when he put o~ 
'his brakes for the dog; is that your testi-
mony~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. N orw, you watched that red stop, light as you 
approached the inteTsection, did you not~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. You were interested in watching that light, 
you didn't want to go through that, did you~ 
A. N'O. 
Q. And you also found time somewhere along 
there to look at that clock and make a deter-
mination as to the time~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. What time was it by the clock~ 
A. About ten after three. 
Q. Did you tell the poJice officer as to the tin1e, 
did you let him know what time it was when 
he questioned you~ 
A. I may have done. 
Q. Did you tell him you looked at the clock and 
it was ten minutes after three at the time of 
this accident~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that right~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now Mr. Covington, you h·ave had consider-
able exp,erience as a driver of auto1nobiles 
you have testified to~ ' 
A. Yes. 
Q. And is .it your practical experience when you 
are gomg through a town where there are 
stop lights to maintain sufficient distance 
behind vehicles so that if they stop, you will 
be able to stop short of a collision~ 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Is that one of the things that as an exper-
ienced driver you make it a point to always 
do~ 
~.\. Yes. 
Q. Do you stay far enough behind the vehicle 
ahead that if it stops you can stop~ 
_A_. Yes. 
Q. Do you consider that that is safe-driving pra~ 
tice and proper~ 
.... \. Yes. 
* * * * 
Q. Do you consider that it is safe driving prac-
tice, according to principles of safe driving 
practice, that a driver should drive at such 
a speed or close behind a vehicle that is a1iead 
of hin1 that if that vehicle makes a sudden 
stop he is unable to stop short of a collision, 
\vould you consider such a driver to be a 
careful driver~ 
Q. Do you consider that to be safe driving 
practice~ 
A. No, I don't. 
* * * * 
Q. }fr. Covington, after you had started through 
this intersection and after Mr. Sturdavant 
had started up from his stopped position, did 
you continue to drive along at such speed 
that you thought you could stop short of 
impact with him were he to stop~ 
_.._-\.. If I had knowed he was going to stop, yes. 
Q. Did you continue to watch ahead of you as 
you traveled down to the point of impact~ 
.A.. Yes. 
Q. Did you contilnue to w·atch the Cadillac car 
at all ti.mes? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And when he 1nade the stop u·ere you in sucll 
f . t9 position a.s to be able to stop short o. 11npac · 
A. No. 
Q. Did you do everything you co~tld? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And frorn tha.t did you concl1tde tha.t you u~ere 
driving too fast to be able to stop U'ere he to 
stop ahead of you? 
A. No. 
Q. How do yo1t accou,nt for thi,s occurrence? 
, A. Well, I was just too close. 
Q. Y au were just driving too close; is tha.t right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if you had been back a. little distance 
this wo?.tld have never ha.ppen.ed; is that 
right? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And if you had been going a little slotrer this 
would have n.ever ha,p·pened; is that right? 
A. That's right." 
Consider for a 1non1ent the above testi1nony in the 
light of the Court's ov1n Instruction No. 9, \Yherein he 
instructs in part as follows (R. 54) : 
"You are instructed that in addition to the 
duty to keep a proper lookout, a driv·er must at 
all times maintain such control over his auton1o-
bile that he will be able to stop, or turn, to avoid 
a collision with any other vehicle lawfully travel-
ing upon the highway and reasonably within the 
range of his vision. And in the event such dri.ver 
fa.ils or neglects to so keep his vehicle under con-
trol as set forth above, he is negligent." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
J7~;e jury had to disbelieve defenda.n.t in order to find 
that defenda.11bt wa.s free fran~ neglect. Yet the Court left 
this issue to the jury. 
It is well settled that a party's evidence is no better 
than his cross-examination. This is especially true where, 
as here, no effort was made to 1nodify or dispute testi-
money elicited by such cross-examination. 
Defendant, even by repudiating his own testimony, 
faces a dilen1ma. It is clear the defendant was either pro-
ceeding too closely and at too great a speed to avoid the 
collision (his own testimony), or he \Vas not keeping a 
proper lookout (a legitimate inference). The authorities 
herein cited uniformly declare tha.t under either circum-
stance defendant \vas negligent as a matter of law. 
The trial court committed serious and prejudicial 
error in submitting the issue of defendant's negligence 
to the jury. 
POINT II. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW PLAINTIFF WAS NOT GUILTY 
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
At the conclusion of the evidence plaintiff, in his 
requested Instruction No. 3, requested the trial court to 
instruct as a matter of law that plaintiff was not guilty 
of contributory negligence. The Court refused to give 
this instruction and gave instead Instruction No. 11, 
which reads as follows ( R. 55) : 
"You are instructed that under the laws of 
this State no person shall stop or suddenly de-
crease the speed of a vehicle without first giving 
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an appropriate signal to the driver of a vehicle 
in11nediately to the rear, "'~hen there is oppor-
tunity to give such signal. Such signal shall be 
given by extending the hand or arm downward 
from the left side of the vehicle." 
Counsel for plaintiff excepted to said Instruction No. 
11 in the following language (R. 201): 
"Plaintiff excepts to Instruction N u1nber 
Eleven and the whole thereof. Particularly Plain-
tiff calls the attention of the Court to the evidence 
indicated in the case which undisputedly shows 
that Plaintiff proceeded from a stop light at a 
slow rate of speed ranging from ten miles per 
hour downvvard, and continued for in the neigh-
borhood of 130 feet at said slow rate of speed. 
Particularly Plaintiff calls attention to the evi-
dence of the Defendant himself wherein he states 
that he was fully aware that Plaintiff was pro-
ceeding at, in his judgment, ten miles per hour 
during that one hundred and thirty feet Inore-or-
less of distance. Plaintiff excepts to the instruc-
tion on the grounds that it leaves to the Jury to 
decide vvhether failure to give a 'varning signal 
that he was proceeding at ten 1niles per hour is 
negligence, where the evidence clearly shows that 
the Defendant knevv that he was proceeding at 
ten miles per hour and the signalling given would 
have added nothing tn Defendant's knowledge 
under the circumstances. Plaintiff excepts also 
on the grounds that a sudden decrease of speed 
was not the cause of the collision in this case but 
a sudden stop was the cause and the only '"·arn-
ing which Plaintiff owed a' dutv if he ·owed a 
. . ' duty at all, to g1ve was a warning of his sudden 
stop, and he only owed that duty where an oppor-
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tunity was afforded hi1n to give such a warning. 
And the evidence undisputedly shows that there 
was no such opportunity for him to give such a 
warning in this case." 
Instruction No. 11 contains substantially the lan-
guage of Utah, Code Annotated, 1953, Section 41-6-69, 
subsection (c), and is no doubt correct as an abstract 
state1nent of the law. When applied to the facts of this 
ease, ho\vever, said instruction is clearly erroneous. 
The only possible contentions that can be 1na.de as 
to plaintiff's contributory negligence are first, that plain-
tiff \vas negligent in failing to give a slow signal, and 
second, that plaintiff was neglegent in failing to give a 
stop signal. 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT NEGLIGENT IN 
FAILING TO GIVE A SLOW SIGNAL. 
Counsel for defendant argued to the jury that plain-
tiff was negligent in failing to give a slo\v signal. 
D·efendant testified that he followed plaintiff past 
the intersection at a speed of approximately 10 n1ph 
and that plaintitf d.id not accelerate his speed. This was 
not a normal movement. A watchful follower would have 
been thoroughly aware that it was not a normal Inove-
Inen t. Nevertheless the jury was allowed to speculate 
that the failure of plaintiff to give a slow signal, even 
though he had been creeping along at less than 10 mph 
all the way from the red light, constituted negligence 
\vhich was the proximate cause of the collision. We call 
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particular attention to the language of Utah. Code An-
notated, 19.53, Section 41-6-69 (c), which states in part: 
"No person shall stop or suddenly decrease 
the speed of a vehicle without first giving an 
appropriate signal * * * ." 
There was no decrease in speed by plaintiff's vehicle 
until the final emergency stop. The aforementioned 
statute does not require any arm signal whatsoever from 
the driver of a slow moving vehicle. Only when there 
is a sudden d.ecrease in speed must a signal be given. 
PLAINTIF·F WAS. NOT NEGLIGENT IN 
F'AILING TO GIVE A STOP SIGNAL. 
Ut,ah Code Ann.ota.ted, 1953, Sec. 41-6-69 (c) further 
states that: 
"No person shall stop * * * 'vithout first 
giving an appropriate signal * * * when th.ere is 
op·p·ortunity to give such signal." 
Defendant offered no evidence whatsoever to show 
or tend to show that p:laintiff had an op·portunity to give 
-an arm signal. On the contrary the evidence clearly 
demonstrates that plaintiff had no such opportunity. He 
traveled about 130 feet from the light to 'vhere he made 
the emergency stop. The emergency stop only became 
necessary when the dog stopped. The windows of his 
uutomobile were closed. The suddenness of the stop itself 
is the strongest possible evidence that no opportunity 
for an arm stop signal existed. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
In the ease of Sm,ith et al. v. Phili.p M orri.s Co., Inc. 
Li1nited et al., (Calif. 1951), 237 P. 2d 295, plaintiff ob-
served cars ahead slowing down. He slowed down over 
a distance of 75 or 100 feet and defendant's driver struck 
his automobile in the rear. The plaintiff failed to give 
an arn1 signaL California has a statute similar to the 
Utah Statute. It was stated: 
" * * * if the court had believed that Sn1ith 
suddenly stopped his car, there would be a ques-
ti.on w·hether he had an opportttt,nity to give a 
signal." 
The Utah Statute was never n1eant to apply to the 
situation of an emergency stop. It is hard to conceive 
of an emergency stop in which the driver has an oppor-
tunity to give an arm signal. The reaction time necessary 
for a driver to 1nove his foot from the accelerator pedal 
to the brake would hardly be a sufficient space of time 
for him to roll down the window of his auto1nobile and 
give an appropriate arm slow down signal. The statute 
contemplates the routine ordinary driving condition 
\vhere a driver decides, for reasons of his own, to slow 
down or stop. Under such circumstances he has prior 
knowledge which, by the exercise of ordinary care, he 
can impart to other drivers upon the public highway and 
thus enhance their safety. This is a far cry from the 
e1nergency situation which confronted the plaintiff. In 
this connection we call attention to the fact that defend-
ant has never contended that plaintiff was negligent m 
1naking the decision to stop. The sole and only testimony 
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concerning the reason plaintiff stopped, is his o"Tn expla-
nation made to defendant immediately after the collision 
and before reflective consideration, and repeated under 
oath at the time of trial, that he made an emergency 
application of brakes to avoid striking a dog (R. 77, 
165). It will he recalled that plaintiff had absolutely no 
other reason for stopp·ing. He was on his. way to Cali-
fornia, having stopp.ed at Salt Lake City for lunch, gaso-
line, and tire rep·airs (R. 73). He had no acquaintances 
at Ameriean F'ork. After the collision and the officer's 
investigation he had his car checked and continued his 
trip: to California (R. 81). 
There was a complete absence of evidence that the 
stop was other than an emergency stop, yet the trial court 
by Instruction No. 11 allowed the jury to conclude that 
the stop was not an emergency stop and that consequently 
plaintiff had an opportunity to give a stop signal and 
was negligent in not giving such signal. 
PLAINTIF:F'S FAILURE TO GIVE AN ARM 
SIGNAL WAS, NOT THE PROXIMATE c·AUSE 
OF THE COLLISION. 
The fact that the· stop, made by plaintiff was an 
emergency stop, and th~at the collision resulted so sud-
denly is the best evidence that a signal would have been 
to no avail. Surely, if defendant was follo,Ying plaintiff 
too closely to have been able to avoid collision in case of 
a sudden stop by plaintiff, then it is inconceivable that 
a signal of any typ·e on plaintiff's part could have avoided 
the collision. Furthermore, the glow of plaintiff's brake 
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light~ occurred at least as early in point of time as could 
any possible arrn signal. If the glowing brake lights did 
not prevent the collision, it is clear that an arm signal 
'vould have been equally ineffectual. 
A stop signal, even if given, would have been lost 
to defendant's inattentiveness. We call attention to the 
fallowing evidence : 
1. Defendant's adn1ission that he looked at the 
clock as he started across the inter8ection ( R. 163). 
:2. Defendant's confusion as to whether or not the 
brake lights of plaintiff's autornobile lighted when he 
stopped (R. 192). 
3. The blank on the officer's report opposite the 
question as to distance \vhen defendant first noticed 
danger (Ex. "G"). 
-!. No skid n1arks \vere left by defendant's automo-
bile ( R. 17 5). 
5. Defendant's res gestae statement to plaintiff 
that he didn't see plaintiff's automobile prior to the 
i1npact (R. 78). 
G. The undisputed ultimate fact that defendant ran 
violently against the rear of plaintiff's automobile (Ex. 
·'F·"). 
Surely no jury question could exist under such a 
state of facts on the issue of the absence of an a.rm signal 
as the proximate cause of the collision. 
The following cases are illustrative of the many 
authorities supporting the foregoing propositions under 
Point II: 
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In C-urtiss v. Fahle, (Kan. 1943), 139 P. 2d 827, a 
car was following a truck by about 150 feet at a sp·eed 
of 45 to 50 mph. The truck swung out to pass a car, then 
suddenly sla1nmed on his brakes and pulled back. De-
fendant noticed the sudden decrease of sp·eed and 
slammed on his brakes but could not avoid the collision. 
There was no signal given of the sudden decrease of 
speed. 
The court held that the absence of a signal '\Vas not 
a proximate cause of the collision. The court cited the 
case of Eldredge v. Sa.rgeant, 150 Ka.n. 824, 96 P. 2d 870, 
874, as stating: 
"Where the absence of lights or warning sig-
nals does not prevent a driver from seeing a 
vehicle in time to avoid it, the absence of lights 
or signals cannot he said to be the proximate cause 
of the collision." 
This case further dealt with defendant's contention here 
that the statute requires a signal of intention to stop the 
vehicle suddenly or to decrease its speed suddenly before 
the necessity arises. The court stated: 
"Such an interpretation 'vould read into the 
statute a requirement to give two signals, which 
the langua~ge of the statute does not warrant." 
In Ritter et ux. v. Jolunson, (Wash. 1931), 300 Pac. 
518, the court stated: 
"While it is true that the driver of a car is 
not required to be a mind reader, and that a driver 
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is supposed to give a signal before stopping or 
materially checking his speed, it is a matter of 
common knowledge that emergency stop's often 
must be made, of which there is no time to give a 
signal." 
In the case of Wohlenberg v. Malcewicz, (Calif. 
1943), 133 P. 2d 12, the lead car suddenly slowed down 
to avoid a truck and was struck in the rear by the follow-
ing car. The driver of the lead car failed to give an arm 
signal but stated that the brake lights \vere \Vorking. The 
appellants urged contributory negligence relying on a 
statute similar to the Utah Statute. It was held that the 
evidence was sufficient to per1nit a finding that the slow-_ 
down occurred so quickly and unexpectedly that the 
driver of the lead automobile had no reasonable oppor-
tunity to give an ar1n signal. The court further stated: 
"Even if there were a technical violation of 
the signaling statute, the trial court was amply 
justified in finding that such assumed violation 
was not a proximate cause of the accident." 
See also: 
Tackett et ux. v. Milbu.rn et al., (Wash. 
1950), 218 P. 2d 298; 
Caperton v. Mast, (Calif. 1948), 192 P. 2d 
467· 
' MacNeill v. Makos, (Pa. 1951), 77 A. 2d 378, 
366 Pa. 465; 
Vienne et al. v. Chalona et al., (La. 1946), 
28 So. 2d 154 ; 
Cook Paint & Va,rnish Co. v. Hicklirng, ( C.C. 
A. 8th, 1935), 76 F. 2d 718; 
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Sniffen 1:. H1(,schle, (N.Y. 1923), 200 K.Y.S. 
206; 
Ri.ccio v. Ginsberg, (R. I. 1927), 139 A. 652; 
Roberson. v. Rodrigue.z et al., (La. 1939), 
186 So. 853; 
llf cDaniel v. Capitol Transport Co. Inc., et al., 
(La. 1948), 35 So. 2d 38; 
Da.niels v. La.ngensa.n1d, (1\Io. 1936), 9G S. 
w. 2d 911. 
For reversal, plaintiff relies upon the refusal of 
the trial court to instruct the jury as a n1atter of la'r 
that plaintiff 'vas not guilty of contributory negligence. 
Specifically plaintiff relies upon the reversible error 
contained in the trial court's Instruction No. 11. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that there 1nust be an evidentiary basis 
before an issue beco1nes one for the jury. In the absence 
of an evidentiary basis such issue is one of la'v for the 
court, and where the court allo~rs a jury to speculate and 
conjecture to a conclusion favorable to one party but 
contrary to the evidence of both parties, a serious pre-
judicial error results. 
We respectfully sub1nit that this case should be 
reversed and that plaintiff should be granted a new 
trial. 
Respectfullv sub1nitted ~ ' 
RA vVLINGS, vV ALLACE, 
ROBERTS & BLACI<: 
JOHN L. BLACI( 
' Counsel for Appellant. 
530 Judge Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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